This Court held a June 11, 2015 hearing to consider the parties’ request that the Court approve the proposed class action settlement, consider the the objections to it and also approve and Class Counsel’s fee application (the “Final Fairness Hearing”).
Homeowners are often required by the terms of their mortgage contracts to maintain insurance coverage on the properties securing their loans. (b) The Court finds that the distribution of the Mail Notice, Summary Publication Notice (published in USA Today), Internet media campaign, the creation of the IVR toll-free telephone number system, and creation of the Settlement Website, all as provided for in the Settlement Agreement and Preliminary Approval Order, (i) constituted the best practicable notice under the circumstances to Settlement Class Members, (ii) constituted notice that was reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise Settlement Class Members of the pendency of the Litigation, their right to object or to exclude themselves from the proposed Settlement, and their right to appear at the Final Approval Hearing, (iii) was reasonable and constituted due, adequate, and sufficient notice to all persons entitled to be provided with notice, and (iv) complied fully with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the United States Constitution, the Rules of this Court, and any other applicable law. The Parties have complied with their notice obligations under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.
If the homeowner does not maintain the required insurance, then the lender is authorized by the mortgage contract to obtain new insurance to cover its interest in the property and the loan.
Lenders do this by contracting with insurance carriers for the insurance’s automatic issuance.
Moreover, Plaintiffs describe the objection as little more than an incorrect, self-interested hunch, belied by deposition testimony submitted after the Fairness Hearing (and also contradicted by similar testimony in other cases from other mortgage loan processors). The Settlement Agreement is finally approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate pursuant to Federal Rule 23(e). A class settlement should be approved if it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” Federal Rule 23(e)(2), and “not the product of collusion.” Bennett v.
The Court has afforded the primary objector, Margo Perryman, more than ample opportunity to pursue her objections, permitting her to submit myriad memoranda [ECF Nos. The terms and provisions of the Settlement Agreement, including all exhibits, have been entered into in good faith and are hereby fully and finally approved as fair, reasonable, and adequate as to, and in the best interests of, each of the Parties and the Settlement Class Members. There is a strong judicial policy favoring the pretrial settlement of class actions.
146, 173, 181], even though neither she nor her counsel appeared at the final fairness hearing. Defendants timely sent notices of the proposed Settlement, including the materials required by that Act, to the appropriate state and federal officials.
For the reasons outlined below, the Court approves in full the proposed class action settlement and Class Counsel’s fee application and overrules all objections.
In addition, other district courts, including district courts in this Circuit, have approved claims-based class action settlements involving lender-place insurance — the type of case at issue here — and those cases are certainly persuasive. They include “(1) the likelihood of success at trial; (2) the range of possible recovery; (3) the point on or below the range of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable; (4) the complexity, expense and duration of litigation; (5) the substance and amount of opposition to the settlement; and (6) the stage of proceedings at which the settlement was achieved.” Id.; see also Faught v.
The primary objector contends that a claims-made process is not necessary because Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) does have the ability, on a systemwide borrower-by-borrower basis, to identify borrowers who have paid the amounts or some portions of the amounts invoiced them for lender-placed insurance, or those who still owe those amounts.
Therefore, the primary objector argues, Ocwen could therefore directly pay Ocwen borrowers.
But Plaintiffs and Defendants view this objection as merely a baseless theory submitted by counsel who has a financial interest in causing the proposed settlement to be rejected. 1992) (“Public policy strongly favors the pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits”); Cotton v. 1977) (“Particularly in class action suits, there is an overriding public interest in favor of settlement”).